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power.1 0 The North Carolina use tax 1 does not have the ten dollar maximum which is contained in the retail sales tax.12 However,
the Commissioner of Revenue construed the two to have the same maximum. This power was given to him in the revenue act and such construction is prima facie correct.' 3 Therefore the North Carolina Use
Tax statute cannot be assailed as discriminatory.
There are court decisions to the effect that a use tax is not a
property tax and thus not subject to the uniformity provisions of the
state constitutions. 14 The North Carolina court has held that a use
tax is not a property tax, 15 and while under our court decisions this
would not necessarily exempt it from the uniformity rule, the effect of
the rule is only to require uniformity within each valid classification
made by the legislature. 16 Many practical distinctions between the two
types of taxes suggest themselves. A property tax is collected annually
while a use tax is collected only once. A property tax is due on a certain date while a use tax is not. And finally the manner of collecting the
two is different.1 7
Thus it seems that the principal case is sound both from a legal
and practical standpoint. This is a progressive attempt on the part of
the state to meet a practical problem in a practical way. It is not an
attempt by the state to erect a barrier to interstate commerce, but
rather an effort by the state to secure the revenue which it justly deserves.
CLARENCE W. GRIFFIN.
Torts-Contributory Negligence of Minors-Question
for Court or Jury.
Plaintiff, a boy of 12, while roller skating was injured when hit by
defendant's negligently driven car. He testified that he was unable to
stop when warned of the approaching vehicle by his playmates and that
he "thought that he could make it but missed." He further testified that
he realized that he ought not to have gone into the street. The judge
"Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631, 76 L. ed. 1232
(1932) ; Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henniford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. (2d) 14 (1935).
"See Note 1, supra.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880 (156)e(12).
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §7880 (191). The construction of a statute by its administrative officer carries great weight in the interpretation by a
court. Cannon v. Maxwell, 205 N. C. 420, 171 S. E. 624 (1933); People Park
Reservoir Co. v. Hinderlider, 57 P. (2d) 894 (Colo. 1936).
"Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henniford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P. (2d) 14 (1935).
"Stedman v. Winston-Salem, 204 N. C. 203, 167 S. E. 813 (1933),
holding that tangible personal property is one thing and the use thereof another,
and one may be taxed and the other exempt.
"'Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1930).
" Forster, Constitutionality of California Use Tax (1936) 9 So. CALin. L.
Rsv. 261.
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submitted the case to the jury on the issue of contributory negligence
and there was a verdict for the plaintiff. Affirmed.'
Had the acts of minor plaintiff been those of an adult, defendant
would have been entitled to a nonsuit on the ground that plaintiff by his'
2
own evidence conclusively established contributory negligence.
Would the North Carolina court ever hold as a matter of law that a
minor is guilty of contributory negligence?
Two tests are used in determining an infant's capacity for exercising
care and his consequent liability for negligence. 3 One is the Subjective
test and uses as its criterion the psychological rather than chronological
age of the child. In applying this test the court takes into consideration
the age, knowledge, experience, and discretion of the particular child.
This is the minority view, but there is a growing tendency on the part
4
of courts to employ it as the more rational solution to the problem.
The second test is commonly called the Objective, and uses the child's
calendar age as a basis for determining his capacity, i.e. by reference
to the average child of the same age. 5 The weakness of this test is its
failure to weigh the individual differences, both mental and physical,
apparent in the makeup of children. What has been thought of as a
third test is the criminal law analogy 6 by which there is a conclusive
"Hollingsworth v. Burns, 210 N. C. 40, 185 S. E. 476 (1936).
'Nowell v. Basnight, 185 N. C. 142, 116 S. E. 87 (1923) ; Lunsford v. Manufacturing Co., 195 N. C. 510, 146 S. E. 129 (1928) ; Scott v. Telegraph Co., 198 N. C.
795, 153 S.E. 413 (1930). For further treatment of contributory negligence see
Bohlen, Contributory Negligenwe (1908) 21 HARv. L. RaV. 233.
§464(2); BURICK, TORTS (4th ed. 1926) §65
3REsTATEmENT, TORTS (1934)
(462) ; 2 CooLEY-, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) §§818-822; SALMOND, TORTS (6th ed. 1924)
§9(4).
'See Central R. R. and Banking Co. v. Ryles, 87 Ga. 491, 495, 13 S.E. 584,
585 (1891). The court said, "The better rule would be for the jury to deal with
each case upon its own facts, unhampered by presumptions of law either for or
against the competency of the child." Berdos v. Tremont and Suffolk Mills, 209
Mass. 489, 494, 95 N. E. 876, 878 (1911). Rugg, C. J. speaking for the court,
"There is no hard and fast rule that at any particular age a minor is presumed to
comprehend risks or to be capable of negligence .... But the sounder doctrine
seems to be that age is an important though not decisive factor in determining
capacity, and that the decision of that question is not helped or hampered by any
legal presumption." Camardo v. New York State Rys., 247 N. Y. 111, 116, 159
N. E. 879, 880 (1928). Lehman, J.stated, "The law does not disregard variations
in capacity among children of the same age, and does not arbitrarily fix an age
at which the duty to exercise some care begins or an age at which an infant must
exercise the same care as an adult."
IWashington R. R. Co. v. State, 153 Md. 119, 137 AtI. 484 (1927) (a child
cannot be required to exercise any higher degree of care than might be expected
of one of similar age) ; Rasmussen v. Whipple, 211 Mass. 546, 98 N. E. 592 (1912)
(boy's conduct must be measured by that of an ordinary, prudent boy of the same
age).
IRenaldi v. Lengar Structural Co., 97 N. J. L. 162, 117 Atl. 42 (1922). The
court held that a child of very tender years was incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but stated that the child's capacity, etc. is the test for
more mature children. Wells v. McNutt, 136 Tenn. 274, 189 S. W. 365 (1916)
(child under seven presumed incapable of contributory negligence but not conclusively so) ; Von Sax v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 217 Pac. 62 (1923). A child of
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presumption of incapacity for children under seven, a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for children between the ages of seven and
fourteen, and a presumption of capacity for those over fourteen. This
is really a rule of law as to children under seven, but, as to children
between seven and fourteen, it is still necessary to use either the Subjective or the Objective test in order to rebut the presumption of incapacity.
In the first North Carolina case on this question, 7 the court followed
the Subjective test as expounded by the United States Supreme Court
in 1873, which declared that, "An infant of tender years is not held to
the same degree of discretion as that of an adult, and the degree depends
upon its age and knowledge. The caution required is according to the
maturity and capacity of the child."'8 The North Carolina court has
followed this doctrine in most of its decisions. 9 But in certain cases
the court has followed the criminal law analogy,10 and in others has unconsciously attempted to blend the two doctrines.:" Their contrariety is
apparent. Such confusion was present in the instant case as the judge
charged the jury that, "If the boy had been the age of fourteen, or an
adult, the court would instruct you as a matter of law that he was guilty
five was held incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Contra:
Johnson's Adm'r v. Rutland R. Co., 93 Vt. 132, 106 Atl. 682, 685 (1919). In
commenting on the analogy to the rule involving criminal conduct of infants the
court said, "There is little, if any, support for the rule by the analogy. Capacity
to commit crime, involving, as it does, discretion to understand the nature and
illegality of the particular act constituting the crime, is one thing, and capacity to
care for one's personal safety is another and quite a different thing.... While the
rule has the merit of simplicity, it is purely arbitrary, and lacks the sanction of
reason and experience."
7Manly v. R. R., 74 N. C. 655 (1876).
'See Washington and Georgetown R. R. v. Gladman, 15 Wall 401 (U. S.), 21.
L. ed. 114, 116.
' Murray v. R. and D. R. R., 93 N. C. 92 (1885) ; Alexander v. Statesville, 165
N. C. 527, 81 S. E. 763 (1914) ; Fry v. Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354
(1922); Ghorly v. R. R., 189 N. C. 634, 127 S.E. 634 (1925) ; Hoggard v. R. R.,
194 N. C. 256, 139 S.E. 372 (1927) ; Brown v. R. R., 195 N. C. 699, 143, S. E. 536
(1928) ; Tart v. R. R., 202 N. C. 52, 161 S. E. 720 (1931) ; Morris v. Sprott, 207
N. C. 358, 177 S. E. 13 (1934).
"Bottoms v. R. R., 114 N. C. 699, 19 S. E. 730 (1894) (child of twenty-two
months held incapable of negligence as a matter of law) ; Ashby v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 172 N. C. 98, 89 S. E. 1059 (1916) (negligence could not be attributed to
a boy of eight); Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N. C. 699, 130 S. E.
638 (1925) (child of four incapable of negligence as a matter of law).
"Rolin v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. C. 300, 53 S.E. 891 (1906). The court stated that
a child under twelve was presumed to be incapable of understanding and appreciating dangers from a negligent act, but that contributory negligence on the part of
a child is to be measured by 'his age and ability to discern and appreciate the circumstances of danger. Caudle v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 202 N. C. 404, 163 S.E.
122 (1931) A prima facie presumption exists that an infant between the ages of
seven and fourteen is incapable of contributory negligence, but the presumption
may be overcome. However the court further stated that the test in determining
whether a child is contributorily negligent is whether it acted as a child of its age,
capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience would ordinarily have acted under
similar circumstances.
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of contributory negligence."' 12 That the plaintiff's capacity to understand the situation and appreciate its dangers was evident to the trial
judge is shown by the admission in his charge that had the child been
two years older a nonsuit would have been ordered. By arbitrarily setting an age of presumptive capacity the trial court had deviated in part
from the Subjective test. When a child's capacity to appreciate the
circumstances is obvious, why should a rebuttable presumption of incapacity keep the judge from directing a verdict for the defendant?
Had the trial court used the criminal law analogy, there was nothing to
prevent a directed verdict for the defendant as the presumption of
incapacity was rebutted by the child's obvious appreciation of his own
danger. Though there has never been a case in North Carolina where
a child under fourteen has been held guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law, 13 there seems to be no reason why it should not be
so held where the circumstances admit of but one inference. In this
same type of case there is good authority in other jurisdictions holding
binding instructions for the defendant proper "where reasonable minds
14
cannot differ."'
In most cases a blending of the criminal law analogy with the Subjective test does not hamper the trial court's effectiveness in applying
the latter test, but in cases like the instant one where the child's capacity
is apparent, the presumption seemed to prevent the court's deciding the
case solely upon the infant's knowledge, maturity, and discretion.
It seems that the best solution to this difficult problem would be to
use the Subjective test in its "pure form." It is true this plan would
offer no definite standard of measurement, yet its adoption would prevent the arising of the confusion manifest in the principal case. Where
any doubt existed as to the child's capacity, the question would be left to
the jury, but where the evidence was clear that the child was either
capable or incapable, the question would be rightfully one for the judge's

discretion.

HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.

"Hollingsworth v. Burns, 210 N. C. 40, 44, 185 S. E. 476, 478 (1936).
'Two cases hold children guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
but on the theory that the question is always one for the court and that to submit
it to a jury would cause a shifting standard. Baker v. Seaboard Airline Co., 150
N. C. 562, 64 S.E. 506 (1909) ; Foard v. Tidewater Power Co., 170 N. C. 48, 86
S. E. 804 (1915). These two cases stand alone and are criticized in Fry v. Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 290, 111 S. E. 354, 359 (1922).
14See Moeller v. United Rys., 13 Mo. App. 168, 112 S.W. 714, 716 (1908). A
boy of twelve sued for personal injuries and the court said, "The question is one
for the jury, unless the only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence is that he was guilty of contributory negligence." In Payne v. Blevius,
280 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 4th. 1922) the court held that the determination of whether
a thirteen year old boy was guilty of contributory negligence 'was a question for
the court where the evidence admits of but one conclusion and the fact is one
about which reasonable minds cannot differ. Scherer v. Wood, 19 Ohio App,
381 (1924) (when the age of the child admits of no doubt as to its capacity to
avoid danger, the court will decide the question as a matter of law).

